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AFTER 15 YEARS OF CONFLICT

Operational Success, Strategic Failure:
Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge
Charlotte F. Blatt
©2017 Charlotte F. Blatt

ABSTRACT: This article outlines the contemporary history of
sectarian conflict in Iraq and identifies the consequences of the US
surge strategy in perpetuating the region’s violence and strengthening
the Islamic State.

B

y 2006, security had declined dramatically in Iraq. The February
bombing of the al-Askari mosque, a major Shia holy site, sparked
a rapid increase in sectarian conflict. Violence in Baghdad
increased 43 percent over the summer; by October, civilian deaths had
risen to more than three thousand per month.1 Thus, in January 2007 the
United States radically shifted the course of the Iraq War by executing
Operation Fardh al-Qanoon, commonly known as “the surge.” Under
General David Petraeus, the surge attempted to reverse the course of
the war and stabilize Iraq using counterinsurgency tactics, which included
30,000 additional soldiers “ ‘[living] with the people’ in order to secure
them.”2 Operationally, the effort appeared to have been a success. By
January 2009, casualties declined from 2,693 to 372 civilians and from
101 to 14 US troops; violent incidents declined from 908 to 195.3 In
recent years, however, increasing sectarian conflict is again jeopardizing
Iraq’s stability.4
At this point it seems the surge has failed to achieve the strategic
objectives—“daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their
leaders, and the government will . . . make progress”—stated by President
George W. Bush in January 2007.5 Why? Most scholarship on this issue
falls into two camps. The first group claims the operation would have
succeeded if President Barack Obama had kept US forces in Iraq past
2011. The second camp argues the mission could not have succeeded
because it failed to address the underlying sectarian confl ict and the
political instability fueling civil war. Due to the complexity of the issue,
determining the correct cause with complete certainty is challenging.
The debate centers around such evidence as the contemporary history
of sectarian confl ict in Iraq, sectarian tension and institutional
mismanagement during the surge, immediate consequences of the surge,
and implications of the strategy. After carefully accounting for such

1 Peter R. Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 31–32.
2 David Petraeus, foreword to Surge, by Mansoor, x.
3 David Kilcullen, Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 45.
4 “Iraq Profile-Overview,” BBC News, December 24 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news
/world-middle-east-14544541.
5 “Transcript of President Bush’s Address to Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq,” New York Times,
January 11, 2007.
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evidence, this article not only posits the military solution to the political
and sectarian problems was misguided but also illustrates lessons from
this operation for use in future confl icts.

The Debate

The optimists in the surge efficacy debate argue Iraq’s increasing
instability is due to troop withdrawal under the Obama administration.
This view claims reduced violence and improved relations with local
communities were squandered in the absence of US troops enforcing
the rule of law.6 David Kilcullen, Petraeus’ senior counterinsurgency
adviser, notes “in a conflict like Iraq, if violence drops when you apply
counterinsurgency techniques, then returns when you stop . . . it suggests
[the tactics] do work . . . and you shouldn’t have stopped before figuring
out a way to maintain the progress.” Kilcullen also criticizes Obama’s
desire to end the war rather than to fight for a status of forces agreement
(SOFA) to extend troops in Iraq past 2011.7 Similarly, Peter Mansoor,
Petraeus’s executive US Army officer, argues the surge was a successful
strategy shift: “Al-Qaeda in Iraq was allowed off the ropes . . . due to
our inability to remain sufficiently engaged in Iraq . . . not to the failure
of the surge as a strategic concept.”8
According to the optimists, two assumptions explain Iraq’s security
decline. First, reduced violence during 2007 and 2008 increased Iraq’s
stability and positioned the government to manage sectarian tension
successfully. For example, former Sunni insurgents, known as the “Sons
of Iraq” (SOI), willingly began working with coalition forces and Shia
police. Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also stood down the Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) Shia militia.9 Second, by the end of 2011, trend lines indicated
efforts to stabilize Iraq were on target; therefore, the 20,000 troops
recommended by General Lloyd J. Austin III, commander of US Forces
in Iraq, would have likely maintained the trend and mitigated the rise of
the Islamic State (IS).10
The second camp argues the surge failed to transform operational
success into strategic success because it did not address the fundamental
problems driving confl ict in Iraq: sectarian tension and weak

6 See, for example, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, “The Anti-Surge: How Obama
Snatched Defeat from the Jaws of Victory in Iraq,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2013; Dick Cheney
and Liz Cheney, “The Collapsing Obama Doctrine,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2014; Rick Brennan,
“Withdrawal Symptoms: The Bungling of the Iraq Exit,” Foreign Affairs, November/December
2014; Sergei Boek Combining Exit with Strategy: Transitioning from Short-Term Military Interventions to a
Long-Term Counter-Terrorism Policy (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The
Hague, 2014); and John McCain, “McCain: Fire Obama National Security Team,” interview on
Morning Joe, MSNBC, June 13, 2014.
7 Kilcullen, Blood Year, 47–48.
8 Mansoor, Surge, 270.
9 Ibid., 264–65
10 Liz Sly, “U.S. Commander, Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, Predicts Turbulence Ahead in Iraq,”
Washington Post, November 21, 2011; and Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing Obama Doctrine.”
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governmental institutions.11 Ali Khedery, the longest continuously
serving US official in Iraq, argues US intervention ultimately failed due
to “empower[ing] a new set of elites who drew their legitimacy almost
purely from divisive ethno-sectarian agendas rather than from visions
of truth, reconciliation, the rule of law, and national unity,” ultimately
fueling nationwide sectarian strife.12 Emma Sky, political adviser to
General Ray T. Odierno, observed positive changes in Iraq immediately
after the surge, and found American-backing of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki in the 2010 national election reflected “supporting the status
quo rather than reform,” which would have been necessary for longterm political stability.13
With this view, trends in Iraqi stability were not sufficiently positive
by the end of 2011 to render the surge a success.14 American troop
behavior did not reduce sectarian confl ict. And, American officials
supported ineffective and unsustainable institutions during and after
the surge. Since Iraq’s security and stability began declining before
troops had left, this camp could not give credence to the optimists’
argument that Obama’s failure to extend the SOFA caused Iraq’s
destabilization. Some members of this camp do consider, however,
America’s inadequate understanding of Iraqi society as a reason Iraq
could not be fully stabilized.15

Contemporary Sectarian History and the Surge (2007–2008)

The history of sectarian confl ict in Iraq is complex. The Shia and
Sunni sects of Islam have lived peacefully together, worshiping the
same god despite different religious ideologies for over a thousand
years.16 Although occasional confl icts over power, resources, and
status have occurred during the last 100 years, recent Western intervention contributed to a resurgence of violent sectarian confl ict in Iraq
before 2007.17
The Sunni minority has consistently enjoyed political control of
Iraq since the time of the Ottoman Empire, consolidating power with
the 1958 overthrow of the British-installed monarchy and effectively
maintaining power during the 1963 Baath Party coup.18 Politicization
of sectarian confl ict increased sharply after the Iranian Revolution of
11 See, for example, Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008;
David Hastings Dunn and Andrew Futter, “Short-Term Tactical Gains and Long-Term Strategic
Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq,” Defence Studies 10, nos. 1–2 (Spring 2010),
doi:10.1080/14702430903377977; Bernard Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics and the Iraq Surge,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly 4, no. 2 (Summer 2010); T. David Mason, “Ending the War in Iraq: The Third
Option,” Civil Wars 14, no. 2 (June 2012), doi:10.1080/13698249.2012.679504; Ivo H. Daalder, “Iraq
After the Surge,” Brookings Institution, December 8, 2007; Alex Kingsbury, “Why the 2007 Surge
in Iraq Actually Failed,” Boston Globe, November 17, 2014; and Peter Beinart, “The Surge Fallacy,”
Atlantic, September 2015.
12 Ali Khedery, “Iraq in Pieces: Breaking Up to Stay Together,” Foreign Affairs, November/
December 2015.
13 Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs
Books, 2015), 338.
14 Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck with Maliki—and Lost Iraq,” Washington Post, July 3, 2014.
15 Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”
16 Geneive Abdo et al., “The Sunni-Shia Divide,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 9,
2017.
17 Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis: Legacy of Exclusion,” Carnegie Middle
East Center, April 2014.
18 David Gritten, “Long Path to Iraq’s Sectarian Split,” BBC News, February 25, 2006.
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1978–79 that established a Shia theocracy focused on inspiring similar
movements in neighboring nations. Saudi Arabia countered Iran’s
ambitions, promoting the Sunni vision of Islam in the region and
supporting Iraq during the long and brutal Iran-Iraq War (1980–88).19
Though notable, the destabilizing effects of Iraq’s dependence on
oil for state revenue and inability to manage and divide the resource
between groups is beyond the scope of this article.
Further disrupting sectarian relations, Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein, a Sunni, pursued a largely secular governance strategy.20 Despite
reports of equally applied force, much of Saddam’s brutality targeted
Shias and Kurds. During the Iran-Iraq War, for example, thousands of
Shias were not only prohibited from freely practicing their religion but
were also expelled from the country, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.
In 2006, Saddam was tried on a charge of “genocide for attempting
to annihilate the Kurdish race” during the Anfal military campaign
(1988) that killed at least 50,000 civilians and destroyed thousands of
villages.21 Thus, Saddam’s practices reinforced the historically Sunni
Arab-dominant society and marginalized Shias and Kurds.22
Arriving in 2003, the United States further divided the population
by forcing each Iraqi to list his or her sect on any state issued document.
This identity was used for the country’s new political structure, pitting
sectarian groups against each other for government positions and
authoritative roles. While this structure placed power in the hands of
the Shia majority, who had long been disenfranchised, the rapid and
aggressive de-Baathification policy disproportionately impacted Sunnis:
they were removed from positions in the military and government and
had few avenues of recourse.23 As the war escalated, tensions worsened,
and violence increased throughout Iraq.24 Though there were certainly
many other divisive factors in Iraqi society, sectarian lines were wellpronounced before the surge.

During the Surge

While “all quantitative measures . . . indicated the tentative success
of the surge” due to the counterinsurgency strategy reducing violence,
and the Sunni community increasingly working with US forces, these
changes did not substantively address underlying sectarian tension.25

19 Ian Black, “Iran and Iraq Remember War that Cost More than a Million Lives,” Guardian
(Manchester), September 23, 2010; Mike Gallagher, “The ‘Beauty’ and the Horror of the Iran-Iraq
War,” BBC News, September 26, 2015; and Abdo et al., “Sunni-Shia Divide.”
20 Musa al-Gharbi, “The Myth and Reality of Sectarianism in Iraq,” Al Jazeera America, August
18, 2014.
21 Edward Wong, “Saddam Charged with Genocide of Kurds,” New York Times, April 5, 2006.
22 Gawdat Bahgat “Saddam Hussein’s Legacy: A Preliminary Assessment and Future
Implications,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 25, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2005), doi:10.1353
/sais.2005.0027; and Gritten, “Long Path.”
23 Daniel Byman “An Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy Failure or a Bridge Too Far?,” Security
Studies 17, no. 4 (October-December 2008); and al-Gharbi, “Myth and Reality.”
24 Mansoor, “A War Almost Lost,” in Surge, 31–43.
25 David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 125–26.
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Sectarian Tension

The surge did not sustain reduced violence for several reasons, which
undermines the optimists’ claim the operation set Iraq toward longterm stability. Cooperation between Sunnis, Shias, and coalition forces
was a marriage of convenience rather than intentional reconciliation.
Sunnis who had previously cooperated with al-Qaeda began to work
with coalition troops as members of the Sons of Iraq due to al-Qaeda’s
control of resources as well as a series of killings of important Sunnis. The
deaths led one Sunni leader to explain “resistance groups [were left] with
two options: either to fight al Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans
or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq. . . . Both
options are bitter.”26 Furthermore, Sunni cooperation with the United
States happened to increase as they were simultaneously losing a civil
war with the Shias. Thus, Sunnis did not form the SOI to cooperate with
the United States because of genuine support for their goals, rather they
were motivated by a desire to reverse their marginalization and to better
position themselves against al-Qaeda and Shias, a risk factor for future
confl ict.27 Similarly, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, consented
to a US assault on Shia militias because he saw cooperation with America
as his best hope for survival.28 And, the US military worked with SOI out
of necessity, unable to take counterinsurgency action without the help of
local allies.29 Thus, cooperation during the surge was unrepresentative
of underlying trends in sectarian behavior.
Also undermining long-term stability, coalition forces used payments to motivate the Sons of Iraq. Sunni sheikhs took as much as 20
percent of US payments to SOI groups, which was often worth over
$100,000. This practice caused concerns that chiefs would not agree to
integrate SOI forces into Iraqi state security services. Most SOI militia
members were already well armed, but some individuals and their
sheikhs were given US weapons.30 Fears that allied militia members
would return to insurgency when the money stopped flowing came to
fruition; violence eventually returned.31
The divergent goals of each sectarian group fueled the violence and
reduced the operation’s state-building capacity because negotiation and
resolution never occurred. Sunnis frequently believed reconciliation
between Iraq’s sectarian groups would mean their restoration to power.
Shias wanted justice for previous regimes’ subjugation indicative of early
elements of Maliki’s regime.32 Kurds viewed reconciliation as respecting
their autonomy.33 When Sunnis realized their cooperation with coalition
troops would not equate to help challenging the Shias, the work with US
forces decreased and some returned to al-Qaeda.34
26 Simon, “Price of the Surge.”
27 Fred M. Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 267–68; and Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”
28 Kaplan, Insurgents, 267–68.
29 Jon Lee Anderson, “Inside the Surge: The American Military Finds New Allies, But at What
Cost?,” New Yorker, November 19, 2007.
30 Simon, “Price of the Surge.”
31 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”
32 Kaplan, Insurgents, 284.
33 Simon, “Price of the Surge.”
34 Ibid.
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Not only did these factors further divide sectarian groups, but US
troop missteps combined with a weak sectarian government also set
Iraq down a path of instability. American presence in Iraqi communities
helped gather better intelligence; however, the lack of understanding
of local culture and language led to the mistaken arrests of thousands.
Prisons became centers of radicalization described as “jihadi universities,”
contributing to later confl ict.35 Furthermore, Iraqis were angered by
decisions to wall off Baghdad neighborhoods and hire and arm SOI
groups without community input. Locals worried the United States
was just arming new militias and further undermining the unstable
state government. The population disapproved of constant raids that
reinforced the idea of the United States as a coercive power, a catalyst
leading some Iraqis to become insurgents.36
The lack of a strong national government throughout the surge
meant Iraq did not develop its own viable and independent national
army or police force. Existing societal divisions materialized within
Iraq’s armed forces, laying the foundation for further sectarian strife
after US troops left.37 Moreover, the Shia government arrested hundreds
of Sunnis who were cooperating with US forces, which was indicative
of the confl icting goals of US and Iraqi leadership and foreshadowed
later sectarian confl ict driven by the Maliki regime.38 Indeed, during the
surge, Shia militias dominated Iraqi government security forces, while
Maliki resisted any threat to his authority. Moreover, groups like the
Jaysh al-Mahdi militia purportedly accepted Iran’s support, increasing
Iranian power in Iraq.39
In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group, a congressionally formed
bipartisan research organization, concluded, “Sectarian confl ict is the
principal challenge to stability.”40 Because the surge did not sufficiently
manage the combination of issues illustrated above, trends in Iraqi
security and stability were bound to be negative after the surge, regardless
of the short-term benefits.

Institution-Building

When Sky left Iraq in 2008, she and Odierno understood “the surge
had not eliminated the root causes of confl ict in Iraq . . . the Iraqis
must still develop the necessary institutions to manage competition for
power and resources peacefully.”41 Troops had not laid the foundation
for the civil institutions vital to the surge’s overall success. Even during
the surge, then-Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta,
recognized the mistake of assuming other elements of Iraqi reconciliation
like institution-building would “fall into place” if surge troops reduced

35 Kingsbury, “2007 Surge in Iraq.”
36 Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
37 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge.”
38 Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Iraq Takes Aim at U.S.-Tied Sunni Groups’ Leaders,” New York Times,
August 21, 2008.
39 Kaplan, Insurgents, 210; and Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
40 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York:
Vintage Books, 2006), xiii.
41 Emma Sky, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty: Winding Down the War in Iraq,” Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2011.
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violence.42 One scholar elaborates: “Only when Iraq’s Sunni and Shia
Arabs and its Kurds all felt represented by the government would the
country be safe from civil war.”43
The problems with institution-building during the surge largely fell
into three categories: institutional discrimination, leadership failures, and
service delivery challenges. Iraqi institutions, largely unchecked by US
forces, perpetuated discriminatory sectarian policies during the surge.
These polices led to sectarian influence over the leadership and the staff
of government ministries and hindered efforts to build a professional
civil service.44 Important ministries remained under sectarian militia
control, “creating an environment of danger and intimidation both
for Iraqi civil servants and their coalition advisors.”45 The population
also experienced government-perpetuated discrimination. One Sunni
neighborhood, for example, received half as much electricity per day as
a nearby Shia community.46
American civil servants spent almost no time mentoring their
Iraqi counterparts due to security concerns about leaving the Green
Zone. Furthermore, action taken by American forces to reform the
government’s sectarian tendencies was described as “fragmented and
incoherent.”47 Thus, the United States did not sufficiently manage the
creation of secular institutions during the surge, allowing destabilizing
sectarian discrimination to continue within the Iraqi government.
The Bush administration attempted to mentor senior Iraqi ministers even though the advice and council US officials provided was
insufficient to guard Iraqi institutions against future turmoil. Both
Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker met frequently, sometimes
even simultaneously, with Maliki, mentoring him about proper
governance; Bush regularly video conferenced with Maliki, seeing
himself as a mentor to the prime minister.48 Former National Security
Adviser Stephen J. Hadley elaborates Bush decided, “I’ve got to be his
best friend. I’ve got to be his counselor . . . Because if he doesn’t succeed,
U.S. policy isn’t going to succeed.”49 Despite these efforts, Maliki did not
heed the counsel he received during the surge and led Iraq back toward
unstable institutions.
By May 2007, there were only 150 members of provincial
reconstruction teams assisting with service provision in Iraq. This
“woefully inadequate” number was not shocking as few State Department
(or even Agriculture Department) personnel know how to maintain
local irrigation systems or electrical grids. Because the United States did
not have enough skilled personnel on the ground, American civil and
42 Leon E. Panetta, “Surge Not Working as Hoped,” Monterey (CA) Herald, September 9, 2007,
reproduced by Panetta Institute.
43 Beinart, “Surge Fallacy.”
44 Colonel Guy T. Cosentino, “The United States Government Interagency Process and the
Failure of Institution Building in Iraq” (Senior Service College Fellowship Project, US Army War
College, 2008), Defense Technical Information Center.
45 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq,
from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Vintage Books, 2013), 512.
46 Anderson, “Inside the Surge.”
47 Gordon and Trainor, Endgame, 511–12.
48 Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016), 143–44.
49 Jason M. Breslow and Evan Wexler, “Who is Nouri al-Maliki,” Frontline, July 29, 2014.
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military personnel did not sufficiently support the Iraqi government’s
delivery of vital services during the surge, which established a long-term
trend of ineffective institutions.50
By late 2007, most Iraqis still lacked electricity, trash collection,
potable water, healthcare, and telephone services.51 Pervasive corruption
exacerbated this problem.52 Even if the United States had increased the
size of the provincial reconstruction teams, inefficiencies would have
likely persisted due to cultural clashes between American civilian and
military bureaus. Thus, the US failure to assist the Iraqi government in
providing services for its people during the surge caused most Iraqis to
view sectarian militias, rather than the state government, as the provider
of security and services.53
Many argue that by mid-2008 the surge was successful and that the
gains would have been maintained with extended US troop presence.54
Stephen Biddle testified to Congress that “the violence reduction was
more than just a temporary lull. It reflected a systematic shift in the
underlying strategic landscape of Iraq, and could offer the basis for
sustainable stability if we respond appropriately.”55 By the end of 2008,
Biddle’s view seemed justified. Violence had declined so substantially
that Iraq’s future seemed bright, the SOI program appeared successful,
and Iraqi institutions seemed relatively stable; however, significant
arguments stand in contrast to the surge optimist viewpoint. Evidence
suggests that at the end of 2008 Iraq was not trending toward long-term
sectarian confl ict resolution even though violence had declined.

Consequences of the Surge

Despite the compelling argument for the surge’s success, Iraq may
not have been as stable as believed. By 2010, challenges leading up to
and surrounding the national election illustrated the surge had not
achieved “sustainable stability” and “Washington had reneged on the
promises it had made to Iraqis to protect the political process and it had
betrayed the very principles the US military believed it was fighting to
uphold.”56 Violence had returned to pre-surge levels in 2012.57 Iraq was
not trending toward long-term sectarian confl ict resolution.

Immediate Instability

Some attribute the increased instability to Maliki, who had been the
US choice for prime minister in 2005 due to his low profi le, leadership

50 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Civil Defense: The Surge That Would Really Save Iraq,” Brookings
Institution, May 21, 2007.
51 Panetta, “Surge Not Working.”
52 Daalder, “Iraq After the Surge.”
53 Pollack, “Civil Defense.”
54 See McCain and Graham, “The Anti-Surge”; Cheney and Cheney, “Collapsing Obama
Doctrine”; Brennan, “Withdrawal Symptoms”; Boek, Combining Exit with Strategy; and McCain,
“McCain.”
55 Stabilizing Iraq from the Ground Up, Hearing on Iraq after the Surge: Political Prospects, Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong., (April 2, 2008) (statement of Stephen Biddle, Senior
Fellow for Defense Policy, Council on Foreign Relations).
56 Sky, Unraveling, 338.
57 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction &
Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).
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skills, and acceptability to Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.58 Indeed, in March
2008 Maliki supported a successful charge against the Jaysh al-Mahdi in
Basra, earning him praise as a secular and patriotic nationalist.59 After
the surge, however, the prime minister began treating former Sons of
Iraq and secular governmental institutions differently.
Broken pre-surge promises to reintegrate former members of the
SOI into post-surge national security forces indicated a continuation
of Iraq’s sectarian struggle. After much resistance, the Maliki regime
agreed to accept 20 percent of the former militia members into regular
state security forces and to employ the remainder in nonsecurity
government jobs.60 But, the government quickly failed to pay salaries to
former SOI members or to complete the integration. Sunni leaders were
also arrested and protests were repressed, which led to additional Sunni
disenfranchisement and future radicalization.61
In 2008, polls indicated public satisfaction with government
services was exceptionally low.62 Some Sunnis compared the Maliki
regime to a Shia mosque due to unequal distribution of government
services.63 Khedery stated, “The insatiable lust for power and money
evidenced by virtually every national leader I met . . . still leaves me
dazed.” Corruption was rampant among leaders from all sects; leaders
supported by Americans engaged in more corrupt behavior than those
under Saddam Hussein.64 Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the surge,
Iraq was not trending toward stability: its leaders exacerbated sectarian
tension while America backed an ineffective regime.

The 2010 Iraqi Election

The Iraqiya coalition—a nonsectarian group headed by Iyad Allawi,
a secular Shia, and leaders of the Sunni community—edged out Maliki’s
State of Law coalition by 2 seats (91 to 89) in the 2010 election. Since
Iraqiya did not win by an outright majority, Allawi should have had
the first chance to form a ruling government coalition; however, Maliki
refused to accept the loss, claiming rampant fraud.65 Though there was
no evidence to support this claim, Maliki pushed Iraq’s high court to
allow him to form a government, preventing Allawi from doing so.66
The United States and Iran also committed to supporting Maliki even
though Iraqiya had won the popular vote.
Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Iraq, opposed the US
decision: “We . . . bandwagoned . . . rather than pushing back and saying
the [Iraqi] Constitution had to be followed.”67 Indeed, Maliki got his way;
58 Sarah Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad: Maliki and the ‘Unmaking of Iraq’,” Frontline, July 29,
2014.
59 Ali Khedery, “Why We Stuck.”
60 Stancati, “Tribal Dynamics.”
61 David Romano, “Iraq’s Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation,” Middle East
Journal 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2014), doi:10.3751/68.4.13; and Mason, “Ending the War.”
62 Sky, “Iraq.”
63 Sky, Unraveling, 253.
64 Khedery, “Iraq in Pieces.”
65 Sarah Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad: Maliki and the ‘Unmaking of Iraq’,” Frontline, July 29,
2014; and Emma Sky, “How Obama Abandoned Democracy in Iraq,” Politico, April 7, 2015.
66 Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Fall and Rise and Fall of Iraq,” Brookings Institution, July 30,
2013.
67 Childress, “Zalmay Khalilzad.”
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a parliamentary coalition formed, reinstated Maliki as prime minister,
and relegated Allawi to be the leader of a strategic council that never
materialized.68 A security dilemma consequently developed from Maliki’s
likely fear of instability among opposing sectarian groups and interest
in protecting his authority in contrast to other sects’ growing alienation
from and escalating anger with the election outcome.69 Iran’s active
role of payment and persuasion—including the head of the Quds Force
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continuously summoning
Iraqis to Iran—during the Iraqi election shifted additional power to
a pan-Shia coalition baking Maliki.70 Moreover, Obama’s promise to
end Bush’s “dumb war” and the global economic downturn decreased
US interest in the region. Thus, Iran’s influence over Iraqi elections
increased, contributing to Maliki’s reversion to sectarian practices.71
Rafi al-Issawi, then-deputy prime minister of Iraq commented, “If
the [United States] acknowledged that Iraqiya won the elections . . .
the others would not have challenged it.”72 Instead, US mismanagement
negatively impacted Iraqi institutions and pushed the nation toward
instability. Maliki began to influence independent governmental
institutions, including the judiciary, government oversight bureaus, and
the election committee.73 Iraq’s national security forces became almost
entirely Shia, another sign of Sunni disenfranchisement.74 Paralyzed
by sectarian disagreement, the government still struggled to provide
basic services equitably. Furthermore, Maliki ordered the arrest of Vice
President Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni, illustrating secular tension at the
highest levels of Iraqi government.75
A combination of the faulty foundations laid during the surge, the
problems leading up to and surrounding the 2010 national election,
and US apathy toward continued stability contributed to the violence
rising to new highs.76 Sunnis were detained without trial and pushed
outside of political processes; peaceful protests against discrimination
faced violent retaliation.77 Indeed, even during the 2010 political crisis,
Khedery returned to Iraq and expressed he “was shocked that much
of the surge’s success had been squandered by Maliki and other Iraqi
leaders.”78 Khedery later noted the Islamic State grew from the defeat
of democratic principles during the 2010 election and the resultant
Sunni radicalization.79 Iraqis did not simply fail to manage their own
government: America failed to reduce sectarian tension during the surge
and to protect democratic principles.
68 Mason, “Ending the War.”
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The Status of Forces Agreement, Troop Withdrawal, and the Rise of IS

The SOFA signed in 2008 established the legal presence of US
troops in Iraq through December 31, 2011.80 Military leaders argued
Obama should negotiate for the presence of 20,000 US troops in Iraq
past 2011; however, the proposed presence dwindled to 8,000 troops;
then 5,000—a size Obama believed would be sufficient to continue
intelligence collection, counterterrorism, training missions, and
checkpoint management.81 There was a caveat: the SOFA granting
troops in Iraq immunity from local prosecution must be renewed.
Maliki would have to sign an executive memorandum of understanding
endorsing immunity, but it had to be approved by parliament. Since US
presence was wildly unpopular among Iraqis, and parliamentarians were
influenced by then-Iran-backed Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, the SOFA
extension was impossible.82 Thus, Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq
at the end of 2011.
Many politicians, military personnel, and journalists argue a residual
troop force in Iraq beyond 2011 would have given the surge more time
to work and subsequently prevented, or at least substantially mitigated,
the rise of the Islamic State.83 The accompanying reduction of US
embassy staff and infrequent communication with the Iraqi government
compounded the destabilizing factors increasing sectarian violence.84
John McCain reiterated this stance in 2014, “General Petraeus had the
confl ict won thanks to the surge and if we had left the residual force
behind . . . we would not be facing the crisis we are today . . . we are
paying a very heavy price.” McCain and others point to nations in which
the United States left troops behind for extended amounts of time, such
as South Korea and Germany, as evidence that Iraq would be a far more
stable country today if we had acted similarly.85
While compelling, this logic does not account for the trend of
sectarian confl ict leading up to troop withdrawal. As the Maliki regime
oppressed Sunnis, former US tribal allies began to view “the Islamic
State as the lesser of two evils when compared with Maliki.”86 Indeed,
sectarian confl ict reemerged while US troops were present, suggesting
that extending US presence would not have substantially impacted the
rise of the Islamic State. Moreover, successful postconfl ict American
presence has historically focused on improving an existing state rather
than laying foundations for a new one. Thus, comparisons between Iraq
and nations with established governments, such as Germany, are poor.87
The counterfactual scenario of Iraq with US troop presence past
2011 casts additional doubt upon the optimists’ hypothesis. While it is
probable extending the presence of US counterterrorism advisers and
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military trainers could have increased pressure on Iraqi terror networks,
“the idea that such a force would have completely stopped the jihadists
is a fantasy.”88 If 175,000 troops in Iraq during the surge could not
ameliorate the sectarian tension propelling the Islamic State into power,
a lesser or noncombat force could not sufficiently reconcile sectarian and
political tension to prevent IS success.89
Although Iraq was not sufficiently stable by 2011 to validate the claim
that the surge was not given enough time to work, troop withdrawal
could plausibly be a major source of Iraq’s return to instability.90 Strong
or conclusive evidence linking troop presence and stability in Iraq from
the end of the surge to troop withdrawal or proof of the effectiveness
of a residual force was not encountered. Such information would be a
compelling reason to consider the surge optimist perspective.

Lessons for Future Conflicts

By recognizing practices that amplified sectarian tension during the
surge, military and government leaders can more effectively manage
future confl icts. Paying tribes to fight alongside coalition forces yielded
short-term benefits that caused long-term problems. When the surge—
and the cash payments—stopped, dissension reemerged.91 Ignorance
of local culture as well as insufficient consultation and ineffective
communication with the populace prevented authentic coalitions from
forming.92 Inattention to the incompatible goals of various ethnosectarian
populations perpetuated confl ict.93 Tolerating a national government
that perpetuates societal divisions and sectarian discrimination prevents
the long-term reconciliation necessary for a stable state.94
The following strategies conversely reduce sectarian tension.
Military intervention must be coupled with efforts to increase
official oversight, agency funding, and interagency communication.95
Collaboration between US personnel and the nascent state’s leaders
must lead to strong governmental institutions that adequately reconcile
sectarian divides.96 Host country personnel interactions with civilian
and military trainers must occur across all levels of government to
ensure adequate representation of the country’s citizens, including in its
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military forces.97 Cultural competency training for US troops must be
completed prior to their participation in interventions.98 These changes
will position American leaders to generate more positive outcomes in
future interventions.
To be clear, this article does not challenge the idea that
counterinsurgency requires substantial manpower, nor does it assert the
absence of positive lessons from the surge. To the contrary, the surge’s
influx of troops living among the people to provide security demonstrated
remarkable operational success.99 But, the operational success could not
be translated into strategic success because corresponding intergroup
reconciliation and institution-building did not occur.
Future efforts should focus on aligning military interventions
with intergroup reconciliation efforts. Research should explore how
US personnel can effectively facilitate intergroup negotiations and
productive dialogue in host countries. Divergent expectations for postsurge interactions should be addressed to bolster intersectarian efforts
to sustain security.100 Finally, strategies to encourage local participation
in military interventions that do not rely on cash payments should be
developed and assessed to prevent similar destabilization.101 The lessons
from the surge provide a powerful starting point for understanding
military, government, and sectarian interactions.
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